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Webb: Procedural Aspects of Litigation under the Texas Environmental St

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF LITIGATION UNDER THE
TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
TROY C. WEBB*
Texas having no general environmental statute similar to the
National Environmental Policy Act, or those found in several states
establishing general environmental rights, it is slightly misleading
to speak of "environmental litigation" within the context of Texas
law. While Texas has strong, well drafted statutes dealing with the
major environmental problems of air pollution,' water pollution,2
and solid waste disposal,' litigation under these statutes falls clearly
within the established areas of administrative law4 and the standard, well-established principles concerning trial preparation and
procedure. Thus, while not dealing strictly with "environmental
law" this article will relate generally what one could expect if involved in litigation under one of the state's major environmental
acts.
ENFORCEMENT

Authority to Enforce
All three statutes provide for enforcement by either the state or
local governments.5 State action is initiated when the governing
board, or the director, of one of the state's environmental agencies,
requests the Attorney General to initiate a civil action to enforce the
provisions of one of the acts.' Local government suits are instituted

* B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Baylor University; Assistant Attorney General of
Texas, Chief, Environmental Protection Division.
1. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, §§ 1.01-6.01 (Vernon 1976).
2. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-268 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
3. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7, §§ 1-11 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1978).
4. A substantial amount of the "environmental litigation" in Texas grows out of challenges to agency actions or enforcement of agency regulations and is governed by the Texas
Administrative Procedure-Texas Register Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, §§
1-23 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
5. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.02-.03 (Vernon 1976) (Texas Clean Air Act),
& art. 4477-7, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (Solid Waste Disposal Act); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 26.123-.124 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (Texas Water Quality Act).
6. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.02 (Vernon 1976), & art. 4477-7, § 8(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.123(d) (Vernon Supp. 1978). The Texas
Air Control Board has primary responsibility of the provisions of the Texas Clean Air Act.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 1.05 (Vernon 1976). The Texas Department of Water
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upon resolution by the governing body of the local governmental
entity and are brought by the attorney for that government.7 All
three acts provide, however, that the state is a necessary and indispensable party in any action brought by a local government.' Therefore, the state is involved in all civil litigation under these acts, and
all actions brought by a local government in effect become joint
prosecutions by the Attorney General and that local government.'
Litigation under these acts generally involves violation of a rule,
regulation, order or permit adopted or issued pursuant to the act.',
The relief sought in litigation arising under these acts is the granting
of an injunction and the imposition of the statutory civil penalty of
not less than $50 nor more than $1,000 for each act of violation and
for each day of violation."
Injunctive Relief
The acts provide that upon a finding that a person is violating,
or threatening to violate, the act or a rule, regulation, permit or
other order of the agency, the district court shall grant appropriate
injunctive relief as warranted by the facts., 2 The major thrust of the
state's enforcement activity focuses on the rule that a prohibitory
Resources administers the provisions of the Texas Water Quality Act, and the industrial solid
waste provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7, §
3(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.011 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The Texas
Department of Health Resources has primary responsibility for the provisions of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act dealing with municipal solid waste. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 44777, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
7. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.03 (Vernon 1976), & art. 4477-7, § 8 (Vernon
Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.124 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The types of
"governmental entities" capable of instituting suit under these statutes vary according to
statute, but can include "an incorporated city, a county, a river authority, or a water dis" TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.001 (18) (Vernon Supp. 1978); see TEX. REV. Civ.
trict ..
STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 1.03(7) (Vernon 1976), & art. 4477-7, § 2(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
8. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.03 (Vernon 1976), & art. 4477-7, § 8 (Vernon
Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.124 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
9. Compare TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.124 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) with id. § 5.012
(the Board is a necessary party to the action and the Board is an agency of the state).
10. In addition to enforcing specific rules, regulations, orders and permits, local governments can also bring nuisance actions under the statutes. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 44775, § 5.05(a)(1) (Vernon 1976); see TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7, §8(e) (Vernon Supp.
1978).
11. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, §§ 4.01(c), 4.02(a) (Vernon 1976), & art. 44777, § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.122 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
12. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 4.02(a) (Vernon 1976), & art. 4477-7, § 8(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.123 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally
Newsom, State Court Injunctions and Their Enforcement in Environmental Litigation, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 821 (1978).
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injunction shall issue upon proof of a violation without regard to
equitable considerations." The rule was most recently stated in the
case of Texas Pet Foods, Inc. v. State, 4 where the court said:
The defendant stands charged with violations of state statutes. The
same statutes which condemn the activity charged against the defendant also provide for its prohibition by injunction. Under these circumstances, if a continuing violation of the statute is established, the
rule for the balancing of equities has no application. 5
Further, it is clear that in order to obtain injunctive relief the state
need not prove scienter. 6
Jurisdiction to Challenge Statute or Rule
Along with eliminating the "balancing of equities" and the element of scienter, the courts have also precluded an attack on the
reasonableness or constitutionality of the rule, regulation, order or
permit involved. 7 The statutes provide that such attacks may only
be brought in the District Court of Travis County within thirty days
of the adoption of the rule, regulation or permit. Holding that this
is the sole method of attack, the Texas Supreme Court in Alpha
Petroleum Co. v. Terrell," stated as follows:
13. While the state often seeks mandatory relief to correct certain conditions created by
the defendant, the primary relief sought is a prohibitory injunction against the violations
alleged.
14. 529 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Id.at 830. See also City of Galveston v. State, 518 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State, 456
S.W.2d 768, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ).
16. City of Galveston v. State, 518 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ) (not necessary to show that the violation was done "knowingly or
intentionally").
17. Such attacks are permitted only in the manner expressly provided by statute and
are not defensive matters in suits for enforcement or compliance. See, e.g., Mingus v. Wadley,
115 Tex. 551, 554, 285 S.W. 1084, 1087-88 (1926) (venue provision of workmen's compensation
statute jurisdictional); Schwantz v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 415 S.W.2d 12, 15-16 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ ref d) (venue provision of driver's license revocation statute
confers exclusive jurisdiction); American Canal Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 380 S.W.2d 662,
665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ dism'd) (venue provision for review of water adjudication statute confers exclusive jurisdiction).
18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 6.01(a), (b) (Vernon 1976), & art. 4477-7, §
9 (Vernon Supp. 1978); see TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 5.131(c), 5.262(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978)
(Water Board and Water Commission rulemaking review is pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure and Texas Register Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 12 (Vernon
Supp. 1978)).
19. 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364 (1933).
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[W]e are compelled to hold that any suit which seeks to annul,
modify, or set aside any rule of the commission valid on its face, ...
must be brought in a district court of Travis County, Tex., and that
this requirement is one of jurisdiction, and not a mere question of
venue. We further hold that, if the rule is one utterly void on its face,
it may be attacked in any court otherwise having jurisdiction of the
case. We finally hold, however, that, if it requires evidence to show
the invalidity of the rule, it is not void on its face, and is not subject
to collateral attack or to attack in any court, except a district court
of Travis County."
THREE MAJOR ISSUES

With "intent," "balancing of equities," and "reasonableness of
the regulation" not being subjects for consideration (except possibly
in mitigation of civil penalties), environmental litigation in Texas
involves essentially three issues: (1) the fact of violation, (2) the
number of days of violation, and (3) the amount of civil penalty to
be imposed.
Fact of Violation
Initially, the existence of the regulation must be established. Generally, this does not present a problem since the two major acts
provide that certified copies of records of the Texas Air Control
Board and Texas Department of Water Resources are admissible as
evidence in court." In addition, the provisions of article 3731a provide for introduction in court of official state documents." While
proof of the existence of a regulation may not be difficult, the
length, technical nature, and frequent amendments characterizing
the regulations and permits, require that a great deal of care be
taken to insure that the document being introduced is current, applicable to the defendant in question, and reflects that proper procedures were followed in its adoption.
20. Id. at 265, 59 S.W.2d at 367.
21. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 2.14 (Vernon 1976); TEx. WATER CODE ANN.

§ 5.052 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Before being admissible, the copies must have "the seal of the
board and the signature of the chairman of the board or the executive secretary .
TEX.
RaV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 2.14 (Vernon 1976).
22. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (provides for
introduction in court of "[alny written instrument, certificate, record, . . . return, report,
...made by an officer of this state or of any governmental subdivision thereof, or by his
. in the performance of the functions of his office and employ-

deputy, ...

or employee

ment .

as long as the document is relevant).

. .
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Proof of violation generally involves highly technical sampling
procedures. Each case is unique and it is difficult to discuss litigation tactics or procedures other than to point out that the following
evidentiary rules must be adhered to.
(A) The type of apparatus purporting to be constructed on scientific
principles must be accepted as dependable for the proposed purpose
by the profession concerned in that branch of science or its related
art. This can be evidenced by qualified expert testimony; or, if notorious, it will be judicially noticed by the judge without evidence.
(B) The particular apparatus used by the witness must be one constructed according to an accepted type and must be in good condition
for accurate work. This may be evidenced by a qualified expert.
(C) The witness using the apparatus as the source of his testimony
must be qualified for its use by training and experience.2"
Additionally, extreme care should be exercised in the handling of an
evidentiary sample which will be used to establish the fact of violation. It is essential that those enforcing the statute be able to clearly
establish the chain of custody from the time the sample is collected
until laboratory analysis is complete and documented.
A major problem in environmental litigation is presenting highly
technical testimony in a manner that is understandable to a jury of
laymen. Again, techniques vary, from case to case but generally
involve the use of simple, understandable lay language and the
introduction of photographs, charts, movies, and on occasion, the
testing equipment itself.24
Number of Days of Violation
The second issue, the number of days of violation, is generally
established by proof of day-to-day violations. Such proof is not always necessary, however, for the state has been able to obtain a jury
verdict finding violations on days other than when the sampling
occurred. 2" This was done by offering a sample showing a violation
well in excess of the limits of the regulation, thus eliminating ques23. Wilson v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 439, 443, 328 S.W.2d 311, 313-14 (1959); Harrington
v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 407
S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966).
24. For a discussion of some of the strategies and problems inherent in the presentation
of evidence see Fleming, Environmental Litigation: An Analysis of Basic Strategies, Trocedures, Substantive Rights and Their Effects, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 749, 766 (1978).
25. State v. Cellotex, No. 3967 (Dist. Ct. of Fisher County, 32nd Judicial Dist. of Texas,
Dec. 12, 1974).
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tions of error in the sample. Next, the state introduced evidence
obtained on discovery showing the number of days the particular
facility had been in operation. Expert testimony established that
this particular facility, when in operation, would not vary in the
amount of pollutant being emitted and that such emissions would
be comparable on all days to those on the day the sampling was
done."6 Obviously, the key factors in establishing day-to-day violations are the polluting facility's variable conditions of operation and
the possible margin of error in the sampling. As a result, proof of
day-to-day violations is not possible in all cases where direct sampling evidence does not exist.
Civil Penalties
The third issue, civil penalties, does not offer as clear cut a factual
issue as the previous two. The legislature has provided for a civil
penalty of between $50 and $1,000 for each day of violation and each
act of violation. 7 The statutes, however, give no guidance-and the
courts have given little more-as to what should be considered by
the jury in arriving at a proper figure. Concerning the question of
penalties, the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Harringtonv. State28
made the following observations:
The basic rule may be said to be that the amount to be awarded in
any case is measured by the rule of just punishment, rather than that
of fair compensation. And the amount of the award depends, among
other things, on the nature of the wrong, the character of the conduct
involved, the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and
sensibility of the parties concerned, and the extent to which such
conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. Although the
amount should be large enough to command respect for the law and
to deter others from similar infractions, it should not be excessive or
oppressive.21
It would thus appear that there is a rather broad range of testimony that could be introduced on the issue of penalties. Mitigating
circumstances, which may have no relevance on the question of
violation, may be extremely relevant on the limited issue of penal26. Id.
27. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, §§ 4.01(c), 4.02(a) (Vernon 1976), & art. 44777, § 8(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.122 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

28. 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 407 S.W.2d
467 (Tex. 1966).
29. Id. at 432 (citing 17 TEx. JUR. 2d Damages § 186 (1960)).
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ties. One area of testimony that has been restricted, however, concerns the financial resources of the defendant."0 In excluding evidence concerning the gross receipts and assets of the defendant, the
Dallas Court of Civil Appeals stated as follows:
We conclude that any logical relevance of defendant's total asset and
gross receipts to the amount of the penalties is slight and is more than
offset by its prejudicial affect. This kind of evidence is likely to divert
the jury's attention from the gravity of the violation and focus it on
the defendant's finances.'
The court did not, however, totally preclude the introduction of
evidence concerning the defendant's financial condition. As stated
by Justice Guittard:
A different question would be presented, for instance, if evidence
were offered of defendant's revenues from the particular plant in
question and the profits resulting from defendant's operation of that
plant in violation of the Board's regulations. Conceivably, such evidence might be relevant to show the gravity of the violation and the
magnitude of the penalty necessary to deter future violations.32
This procedure would require a great deal of discovery of the financial records of the defendant and a detailed analysis of the defendant's income tax returns. Generally, it is necessary for the state to
produce such records, since in order for the jury to assess a civil
penalty that will act as a deterrent, without being unduly oppressive, knowledge of the financial situation of the defendant is required.
A factor increasingly being used to determine civil penalties in
federal environmental cases, and required in some instances by the
Federal Clean Air Act,33 is the economic savings that have accrued
to the defendant by his failure to install and properly operate the
required pollution abatement equipment.3 4 The Environmental Pro30. See P.J. Willis & Bro. v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465, 474-75 (1882); McCollum Exploration
Co. v. Reaugh, 146 S.W.2d 1109, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940), aff'd, 139 Tex.
485, 163 S.W.2d 620 (1942); Texas Public Utilities Corp. v. Edwards, 99 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ' dism'd). These cases were all discussing the issue as it relates

to exemplary damages rather than civil penalties.
31. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State, 524 S.W.2d 313, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975,

writ refd n.r.e.).
32. Id. at 322.
33. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7420(a)(2)(A)(iii), (d)(2) (Supp. 3 1977 & Supp. 4 1978). "In the
case of a penalty ... the costs ... shall be the economic value of non-compliance with the
" Id.
interim emission control requirement ....

34. Id. § 7420(a)(2)(A)(iii). See also id. § 7413(b).
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tection Agency is strongly urging all state programs to use this factor
as a major consideration in arriving at civil penalties. It appears this
is a factor that can certainly be considered under the court's holding
in State v. Harrington,5 and is consistent with Lloyd Fry Roofing
Co. v. State" as well. This method of calculating appropriate fines
will most probably become a major factor in the imposition of both
negotiated and jury or court assessed civil penalties.
CONCLUSION

In summary, it can be said that environmental litigation in Texas
involves straightforward simple legal issues and clearly defined factual issues. Proof of these factual issues involves highly complex
technical testimony requiring a great deal of preparation and full
discovery. This discovery and preparation will vary from case to
case and does not lend itself to simple rules and guidelines that can
be followed in every case.
35. See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
36. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State, 524 S.W.2d 313, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This case was reheard on a later appeal after remand in the above
opinion. The latter opinion does not, however, discuss penalties. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. v. State, 541 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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